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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
INTERPRETING THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT: DIRTY DEEDS DONE 
DIRT CHEAP IN McCUNE v. OREGON 
SENIOR SERVICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In McCune v. Oregon Senior Services/ the Ninth Circuit 
held that a group of domestic service employees were excluded 
from minimum wage coverage under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 (FLSA) as they performed companionship services 
for the elderly and infirm.2 The employees would have been en-
titled to minimum wage if the services they performed fell 
within an exception to the FLSA's companionship services ex-
emption.a The Ninth Circuit based its decision on the Secretary 
of Labor's interpretation of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA.4 
1. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990) (per Trott, J., 
the other panel members were Rymer, J., and Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
2. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d at 1108-11. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 
(1988), for text of the FLSA. 
The plaintiffs originally brought their claim when the federal minimum wage was 
$3.35 an hour. 29 C.F.R. § 552.100 (1989). Minimum wage was $3.35 an hour from Janu-
ary I, 1981 to April I, 1990. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(l) (1988 and Supp. 1990). It was raised to 
$4.25 an hour on April I, 1991. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1990). 
3. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108-09. If the court had found the attendants were 
"trained personnel" or performed "general household work" according to 29 C.F.R. § 
552.6 (1989), the attendants would have been entitled to minimum wage under the 
FLSA. Id. at 1109-11. See infra note 54 for text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). 
4. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. 29 U.S.C. § 206(0(2) (1988 and Supp. 1990) provides: 
Any employee who in any workweek (A) is employed in do-
mestic service in one or more households, and (B) is so em-
ployed for more than eight hours in the aggregate, shall be 
paid wages for such employment in such workweek at a rate 
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The court found that these domestic service workers were not 
trained personnel and were merely employed in a companion-
ship services capacity.1i Therefore, they were not covered by 
minimum wage provisions as the FLSA does not guarantee mini-
mum wage to employees who are domestic companions.a 
II. FACTS 
The plaintiffs worked as full-time, live-in attendants7 for 
29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1988) states, in part: 
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees. . . who in 
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged 
in commerce . . . and who is such work-week is brought 
within the purview of this section by the amendments made to 
this chapter by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 
1974, wages at the following rate: Effective after December 31, 
1977 not less than the minimum wage rate in effect under sub-
section (a)(l) of this section. 
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1988) states, in part: 
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: (1) ... 
[NJot less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning Janu-
ary 1, 1978, not less than $3.10 an hour during the year begin-
ning January 1, 1980, and not less than $3.35 an hour after 
December 31, 1980 .... 
This statute was revised in 1988. See supra note 2. 
Congress specifically determined that domestic service workers affect commerce, and 
are therefore entitled to minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). See also, H.R. REP. 
No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
28ll, 2821, (hereinafter Legislative History). 
5. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-10. 
6. Id. at nos. The FLSA does not extend minimum wage protection to " any em-
ployee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysit-
ting or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companion-
ship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for 
themselves .... " 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). 
The court observed that the attendants would enjoy FLSA minimum wage coverage 
'if they qualified as "trained personnel" or provided "general household work," the only 
two exceptions to the companionship services exemption. McCune. 894 F.2d at ll08-09. 
7. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d ll07. 1108 (9th Cir. 1990). Many of 
the plaintiffs were Certified Nursing Assistants ("CNAs"). McCune v. Oregon Senior 
Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1449 (D. Or. 1986). CNAs receive 60 hours of formal training 
in various areas such as nutrition, personal hygiene. body mechanics, and elimination. 
Brief for Appellants at 35, McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d ll07 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Nos. 88-3843 and 88-6332 PAl (citing OR. ADMIN. R. 851-20-ll3 (1985)). See also 
infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text for related background discussion. 
The attendants contended that they were required to be present at their client's 
homes for 18 to 20 hours a day. McCune V. Oregon Senior Services. 643 F. Supp. 1444, 
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elderly and infirm people who were unable to care for them-
selves.s Two sub-agencies of the Oregon Department of Human 
Resources (DHR) administered the in-home care programs and 
funding. 9 
The attendants performed a variety of daily services for cli-
ents including cooking, cleaning, hygiene, and medical care.10 
There were three types of. domestic service employment that 
were relevant to the attendants' claim. ll The attendants' rate of 
pay was determined by the specific type of work performed.12 
Many of the hours that the attendants worked were paid at 
$1.50 to $1.55 per hour,13 which was less than the federal mini-
mum wage. 14 
The attendants brought suit against the defendantsUi in 
1447 (D. Or. 1986). 
8. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. The in-home care recipients had limited financial re-
sources. Brief for Appellants at 6, McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-3843 and 83-6332-PA). The maximum monthly income was $326.70 
for a disabled person to be a recipient of the live-in attendant program; income above 
that level had to be given to the State. [d. See also OR. ADMIN. R. 4610-05-922 and 461-
06-105 (1985). 
Plaintiffs worked under individual contracts with the State. McCune, 894 F.2d at 
1111. 
9. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1445. The two subagencies of 
DHR were the Senior Services Division (SSD) and the Adult and Family Services Divi-
sion (AFSD). [d. 
10. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. Although the opinion of the Ninth Circuit did not 
list the attendants' duties, the opening brief filed on their behalf indicates that the at-
tendants cleaned house, did laundry, shopped, prepared and cleaned up after meals, 
transported, and bathed and dressed clients. Brief for Appellants at 16. 
Further, the opening brief states, "when plaintiffs perform household cleaning, it is 
not dusting a Waterford crystal collection; plaintiffs' household chores involve cleaning 
up feces, urine and vomit. Their so-called 'companionship services' include such job de-
scriptions as bowel elimination." Brief for Appellants at 3'8. 
11. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp at 1446. The three types of 
domestic service employment at issue were companions, housekeepers/chore persons and 
personal care providers. [d. See infra notes 26-41 and accompanying text for discussion 
of SSD manual provisions. 
12. Brief for Appellants at 11. 
13. [d. 
14. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. The minimum wage was $3.35 an hour. [d. In addi-
tion to the hourly wage, the attendants also received room and board in their respective 
client's home, which was often necessary to take proper care of the client. McCune v. 
Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1449. The live-in attendants were not entitled to 
overtime hours because they received room and board. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21) (1988). 
15. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Or. 1986). The defend-
ants in this action were: the Oregon Senior Services Division (SSD); Richard Ladd and 
Dexter Henderson, Administrators of the SSD; the Oregon Adult and Family Services 
3
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United States District Court for the District of Oregon,I6 seeking 
minimum wage for all hours worked pursuant to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938.17 The attendants claimed that they 
should have been paid the minimum wage as their domestic ser-
vice work qualified them under a 1974 FLSA amendment.1s This 
amendment guarantees minimum wage to any domestic service 
worker employed in one or more households, for more than eight 
hours per week. IS 
The district court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment20 based on its finding that the attendants per-
formed companionship services, which were specifically ex-
empted from FLSA minimum wage protection.21 The district 
Division (AFSD); Keith Putnam, Administrator of the AFSD; the Oregon Department of 
Human Resources (DHR); and Leo Hegstrom, Administrator of the DHR. McCune, 894 
F.2d at 1107. 
16. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1444. The attendants 
brought suit under federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1989), 
which provides: "The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
17. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1445. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 
(1988). 
18. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-11. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(0(2) (1988) for text of appli-
cable 1974 FLSA amendment. 
19. Brief for Appellants at 16-24. The attendants also sought an order from the dis-
trict court that would require the State to compensate them for all the hours they actu-
ally worked, rather than those hours authorized by a State agency. McCune v. Oregon 
Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1451 (emphasis added). The district court noted that if 
the defendants knew the attendants were working mQre hours than were authorized and 
did ~ot object, then the employees had to be compensated for all the hours they were 
allowed to work. [d. 
20. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. A summary judgment is properly granted when a 
judge determines that a party has not alleged a genuine issue of fact, and that party is 
not entitled to prevail as a matter of law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (5th ed. 1979). 
21. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1449, 1454. The district 
court found that the attendants solely provided, "fellowship, care, and protection" for 
their clients, and therefore were exempt from minimum wage under the companionship 
services exclusion. [d. at 1448. The court did not discuss or examine the attendants' 
specific job functions before it concluded that the attendants performed companionship 
services. [d. at 1448-49. The court noted the attendants would "enjoy minimum wage 
coverage only if they fit within the trained personnel or general household exceptions." 
[d. at 1449. 
The court determined that the attendants' CNA training did not qualify the attend-
ants as "trained personnel" as the CNA course did not, "provide the depth of training 
required for RNs or LPNs." McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1449 
(D. Or. 1986). The "on-the-job" training that the attendants received did not qualify 
them for minimum wage. [d. at 1450. The court observed that the attendants might be 
performing tasks that they were forbidden from performing according to Oregon regula-
tions. [d. at 1449-50. The court did not want to "reward" the attendants with minimum 
4
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court also determined that the attendants did not fall under ei-
ther the trained personnel or the general household work excep-
tions to the companionship exclusion.22 The attendants appealed 
the district court's decision. 23 . 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. OREGON'S IN HOME SERVICE PROGRAM 
The State of Oregon provides in-home service care for eld-
erly, blind, and disabled people who qualify for public assis-
tance.24 This program allows the elderly and 'infirm to stay in 
their own home, receive personal care, and avoid 
hospitalization.25 
The Oregon Senior Services Division (SSD) establishes and 
maintains policies for compensating in-home domestic service 
employees and the Adult and Family Services Division (AFSD) 
makes the actual payments.26 The SSD establishes the pay 
scales and job descriptions for each type of domestic service.27 
wage if they were violating Oregon's regulations. Id. at 1450. The court noted that if the 
attendants' informal training qualified the attendants for minimum wage, the state 
would suffer from an "administrative nightmare." Id. Further, the court refused to estop 
the defendants from raising the general household work exemption. Id. at 1451. 
22. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (D. Or. 1986). 
23. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990). 
24. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (D. Or. 1986). In-
home care service for the elderly or infirm is not unique to Oregon. Nearly every state in 
America offers some type of government assisted home service care for aged and disabled 
people. Telephone interview with Ms. Francis Contreras, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services - Medicaid Division (December 5, 1990). For example, California offers 
low-cost, government assisted in-home care service for individuals who cannot afford for-
mal medical institutionalization. See Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 
704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). 
There are only 12 states (including the District of Columbia) that do not provide 
federally assisted home care service programs for the aged and disabled. Letter from Ms. 
Francis Contreras to the author (December 6, 1990) (listing national home and commu-
nity based health service programs). 
25. McCune, 643 F. Supp. at 1446. Thus, the high costs of formal medical institu-
tionalization are alleviated for the state and the recipient. McCune v. Oregon Senior 
Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990). 
26. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446. 
27. Id. at 1447. "Companionship services were paid $1.50 per hour, to a maximum of 
$361.00 per month. Housekeeping services were paid $3.55 per hour, the current mini-
mum wage, to a maximum of $140.00 per month. Personal care services were paid $3.55 
per hour. Most live-in domestic employees could earn up to $646.00 per month." Id. The 
attendants received pay for a maximum of eight hours a day, and many of the hours 
5
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The SSD outlines its policies in a manual which the AFSD 
utilizes to calculate the state domestic workers' wage rates.28 
Prior to 1985, the SSD manual provided for four types of in-
home service employees: (1) homemaker; (2) companionship; (3) 
housekeeper/chore; and (4) personal care.29 In April 1985, SSD 
changed its policies to include only two types of in-home em-
ployment services: Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Self-
Management Activities (SMA).sO . 
According to the pre-1985 policies outlined in the SSD man-
ual, a domestic worker performed companionship services by 
providing fellowship and protection for an aged or mentally in-
firm person who could not care for their own needs. 31 The major 
purpose of companionship service was to be there for the client; 
the job did not require specialized training or provide for spe-
cific duties. 32 Housekeeper/chore services included basic house-
keeping tasks, such as housecleaning, food shopping, laundry 
and meal service.s3 Personal care service was designed to main-
tain, strengthen, or restore an individual's functioning. 3• Only 
Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) who passed a sixty-hour 
training course could provide personal care services, which in-
cluded giving baths to the client, assisting with medication, and 
maintaining catheters and colostomy bags. 3~ 
wO.rked were only paid at the rate of $1.50 per hour. Brief for Appellants at Ii, McCune 
v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990). (Nos 88-3843 and 83-6332-PA). 
These rates "depended on the type of service, rather than the attendant's qualifica-
tions." [d. 
28. Brief for Appellants at 11. See a/so, id. at 7. 
29. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446. 
30. [d. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for discussion of amended poli-
cies. The new and old policies outlined in the SSD manual were relevant as the plaintiffs 
worked during a time period when both policies were in effect. McCune v. Oregon Senior 
Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446. 
31. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447 (citing Oregon SSD 
manual at 11). 
32. [d. 
33. [d. Housekeepers were required to have at least sixteen hours of training, in-
cluding first aid, home safety and maintenance, and an orientation to working with the 
elderly. [d. at 1446 (citing Oregon SSD manual at 12-17). 
34. [d. at 1447 (citing Oregon SSD manual at 23). These tasks were performed when 
the individual's condition was stabilized, but continued medical (RN) supervision was 
necessary. [d. 
35. [d. Personal care service did not include skilled nursing services which were pre-
scribed by a physician and supervised by a registered nurse. [d. (citing Oregon SSD man-
ual at 23-30). The job classification "homemaker" was not relevant to the instant case. 
6
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After April 1, 1985,36 in-home employment services were 
classified into two categories.37 The first, ADL, included assis-
tance with eating, dressing, personal hygiene, mobility, bowel 
and bladder care.38 The second, SMA, included medication man-
agement, transportation, meal preparation, shopping and house-
hold maintenance.39 ADL tasks were to be paid at $3.55 per 
hour,40 and SMA tasks were to be paid either $3.55 per hour or 
$1.55 per hour, depending on whether the attendant was covered 
by an FLSA provision that required the attendant be paid the 
federal minimum wage.41 
B. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 
1. General Applicability 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)42 regulates 
various employer-employee areas such as minimum wage,43 
equal pay,H overtime pay,45 and child labor.46 The FLSA was 
Id. at 1446. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
36. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446. 
37. Id. These new rules also divide ADL and SMA into three levels, according to the 
client care needed for each activity. Id. at 1447. 
38. Id. See aLso OR. ADMIN. R. 411-30-020(1) (1985). 
39. OR. ADMIN. R. 411-30-020(31) (1985). Caseworkers assess the client's ADL and 
SMA needs for different activities. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 
1447. There are maximum monthly hours that can be spent for ADL and SMA at the 
three care levels; a more dependent client would lead to more hours authorized for each 
activity. Id. See aLso OR. ADMIN R. 411-30-022 (1985). The new and old rules limited the 
domestic service employees' work to eight hours per day. McCune v. Oregon Senior Ser-
vices, 643 F. Supp. at 1447. 
40. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447. There was a slight 
increase in this rate when a client required the highest care level. OR. ADMIN. R 411-30-
022(2)(b)(A)(iii) (1985). 
41. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447 (citing OR. ADMIN. R. 
411-30-022(2)(b)(A)(iii) (1985)). The district court recognized that some employees may 
be covered by 29 U.S.C. § 206(f)(l) (1988) which states that any employee: 
who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in a 
household shall be paid wages at a rate not less than the wage 
rate in effect under subsection (b) of this section unless such 
employee's compensation for such service does not ... consti-
tute minimum wages for the purposes . . . of such Act. 
42. 29 U.s.C. §§ 201-19 (1988). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988). See supra note 4. 
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) provides: 
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of 
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in 
which such employees are employed, between employees on 
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
7
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designed to protect certain groups within the labor force being 
paid substandard wages and working excessive hours." Workers 
the FLSA intended to aid included the unprotected, unorgan-
ized, and lowest paid members of the nation's population.48 Ini-
tially, however, some of the nation's lowest paid employees were 
not afforded minimum wage protection under the FLSA.49 FLSA 
amendments subsequently extended minimum wage coverage to 
many of those low-paying occupations. llo 
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to 
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal 
work .... 
45. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988) provides: 
(a)(l) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no em-
ployer shall employ any of his employees who in any work-
week is engaged in commerce Of in the production of goods for 
commerce . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless 
such employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
46. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1988) provides, "(a) No producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall 
ship or deliver for shipment in commerce any goods produced in an establishment situ-
ated in the United States in or about which within thirty days prior to the removal of 
such goods therefrom any oppressive child labor has been employed . . . ." 
47. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History 
at 2811-13. See also, Fair Labor Standards Act, [June) L.R.R.M. (BNA) No. 392 at 21-
36 (June 6, 1987). Congress found that substandard wages and working excessive hours 
endangered the employees' mental and physical health and impeded the free flow of 
goods through interstate commerce. Id. 
48. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (night watchman for a 
business substantially devoted to production of interstate goods was entitled to FLSA 
protection), reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 893 (1945). 
49. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History 
at 2813-14. See also, Fair Labor Standards Act, [June) L.R.R.M. (BNA) No. 392 at 21 
(June 6, 1987). The Wage and Hour Manual documented the evolution of the FLSA: 
The laws relating to employment standards which were en-
acted prior to 1933 were limited to (1) employees of the Gov-
ernment itself, (2) work performed for the Government by pri-
vate contractors, and (3) private employment in a few specific 
industries. And, until the 1930's, the legislation put on the 
books dealt only with hOUfS of work. 
Congress intended the FLSA to extend minimum wage to workers engaged in or having 
an affect on interstate commerce in order to maintain "minimum standards of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and well-being of workers .... " H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2811. 
50. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C). 
8
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2. FLSA Domestic Service Worker Amendment of 1974 
In 1974, the FLSA was amended to extend minimum wage 
protection to domestic service workers.tll 
a. Amendment Exemptions 
Congress enacted specific exemptions to the 1974 amend-
ment which excluded certain domestic workers from minimum 
wage protection. 52 Domestic service workers employed as baby-
sitters on a casual basis or companions for the aged and infirm 
were specifically exempted from FLSA minimum wage 
protection. 53 
Domestic employment on a "casual basis" and the scope of 
"babysitting services" and "companionship services for the aged 
or infirm" are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR).54 
51. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History 
at 2813-14. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). This amendment was enacted as Congress deter-
mined that domestic service employees performed functions that affected interstate com-
merce. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). Congress observed, "It is the intent of this committee to 
include within the coverage of the Act all employees whose vocation is domestic service." 
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845. 
Workers affected by the 1974 amendments were domestic service workers, federal, state, 
and public employees, telegraph agency employees, and hotel and restaurant workers in 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. [d. at 2820-21. 
The enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 culminated a 
four-year effort to increase the minimum wage and expand coverage under the FLSA. 
Fair Labor Standards Act, [Junej L.R.R.M. (BNA) No. 392 at 35 (June 6, 1987). Con-
gress thereby included domestic service employees in the class of workers covered by the 
FLSA. Marshall v. Rose, 616 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1980) (night watchmen who performed 
domestic services in addition to patrolling were entitled to minimum wage under the 
FLSA). 
52. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1988). 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). Congress exempted these workers because they 
were not regular breadwinners or responsible for supporting a family. H.R. REP. No. 913, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845. 
54. 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.1-.110 (1989). The three specific terms are defined and dis-
cussed at 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.3-.6 (1989). 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 defines domestic service employ-
ment as: 
[Sjervices of a household nature performed by an employee in 
or about a private home of the person by whom he or she is 
employed. The term includes employees such as cooks, wait-
ers, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, nurses, 
janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, foot-
men, and grooms and chauffeurs of automobiles for family use. 
9
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The Secretary of Labor determined that the "casual basis" 
limitation only applied to the babysitting exemption,lIl1 There-
fore, a babysitter's employment that is intermittent or irregular 
is excluded from FLSA minimum wage protection,II6 However, if 
babysitting is the permanent vocation of the domestic worker, 
then the employee will be afforded minimum wage coverage 
under the FLSA,II7 A casual babysitter who performs limited 
household work unrelated to the children would not be entitled 
to FLSA minimum wage protection,II8 
This section "includes babysitters employed on other than a casual basis," and disclaims 
itself as "illustrative, not exhaustive." 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (1989). 29 C.F.R. § 552.4 defines 
babysitting services as: 
[T]he custodial care and protection, during any part of the 24 
hour day, of infants or children in or about the private home 
in which the infants or young children reside. The term 
babysitting services does not include services relating to the 
care and protection of infants or children which are performed 
by trained personnel, such as registered, vocational, or practi-
cal nurses. 
This section does not remove these specially trained people from the category of a cov-
ered domestic servant, "when employed in or about a private household." 29 C.F.R. § 
552.4 (1989). 29 C.F.R. § 552.5 defines the term casual basis when applied to babysitting 
services as: 
[E]mployment which is irregular or intermittent, and which is 
not performed by an individual whose vocation is babysitting. 
Casual babysitting services may include the performance of 
some household not related to caring for the children, pro-
vided, however, that such work is incidental and does not ex-
ceed 20 percent of the total hours worked on the particular 
babysitting assignment. 
29 C.F.R. § 552.6 explains that the term 'companionship services' includes: 
[T]hose services which provide fellowship, care, and protection 
for a person who, because of advanced age or physical or 
mental infirmity, cannot care for his or her own needs. Such 
services maY'include household work related to the care of the 
aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, 
washing of clothes, and other similar services. They may also 
include the performance of general household work: provided 
however, that work does not exceed 20 percent of the total 
weekly hours worked. The term 'companionship services' does 
not include services relating to the care and protection of the 
aged or infirm which require and are performed by trained 
personnel, such as a registered or practical nurse. 
The CFR is the general body of regulations governing the practice and procedure of 
federal administrative agencies, including the Department of Labor. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 233-34 (5th ed. 1979). 
55. 29 C.F.R. § 552.5 (1989). 
56. Id. 
57.Id. 
58. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54 for full text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 
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The Secretary further interpreted the FLSA to exempt 
those workers who perform companionship services for the aged 
or infirm from minimum wage protection, unless the employees 
fit under a specific exception.69 The Secretary found that a 
"companion" is a worker who provides fellowship, care, and pro-
tection for an individual because that person is either aged, or 
physically or mentally infirm.60 Further, a companion does not 
change job status by performing limited general household work 
that is unrelated to the aged or infirm person.61 
b. Amendment Exemption Exceptions 
The Secretary of Labor determined that the FLSA provides 
two exceptions to the "casual basis" and "companionship ser-
vices" exemptions.62 First, there is a "trained personnel" excep-
tion to the companionship services exemption that will qualify a 
worker for minimum wage coverage under the FLSA.63 The Sec-
retary indicated that registered or practical nurses are examples 
of the types of workers that fall within the "trained personnel" 
exception.64 
Second, a general household work exception, is applicable to 
both the casual babysitting and companionship services exemp-
tions.66 The Secretary of Labor determined that if a domestic 
worker performed general household work for over twenty per-
cent of the total weekly hours worked, and this work was unre-
lated to the care of the baby or aged person, the FLSA required 
that those hours be paid at the minimum wage.66 
(1989). Congress further stated: "The fact that persons performing casual services such 
as baby-sitters or services as companions do some incident of household work does not 
keep them from being casual baby-sitters or companions for purposes of this exclusion." 
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845. 
59. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
60. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
61. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
62. 29 C.F.R. § 552.5-6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
63. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. "Trained personnel" perform ser-
vices for aged and infirm clients which require performance by trained personnel. 29 
C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). 
64. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
65. 29 C.F.R. § 552.5-6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
66. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. 
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C. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GENERAL FLSA PROVISIONS 
The courts have liberally interpreted the FLSA to extend 
minimum wage protection to a large number of employees.67 For 
example, in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of 
Labor,68 the Court found that a religious foundation constituted 
a business enterprise,69 that its members who contributed "ser-
vices" were employees70 and awarded minimum wage under the 
FLSA.71 The Ninth Circuit has also liberally interpreted the em-
ployer-employee definition to find an employment relationship 
existed for a group of agricultural workers.72 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the determination of whether an employment rela-
tionship existed depended on all of the circumstances of the 
work activity rather than the presence of anyone dispositive 
factor.73 
In A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling," the Supreme Court ob-
served that the FLSA is "humanitarian and remedial legisla-
tion."711 Further, the Court determined that FLSA exemptions 
should be narrowly construed in order to meet the legislative 
67. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text. 
68. 471 U.S. 290 (1985). The Court observed that the FLSA should be interpreted 
and applied broadly to comport with congressional intent. Id. at 297 (citing Mitchell v. 
Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (Court found that non-executive 
employees of an architectural firm affected interstate commerce and were entitled to 
minimum wage». 
69. Id. at 296-98. 
70. Id. at 299-302. 
71. Id. at 306. 
72. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc. Inc., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979) (agricultural 
workers sought minimum wages under the FLSA). In Driscoll Strawberry, the court 
found an employer-employee relationship existed between strawberry growers and a 
berry contracting corporation under the FLSA despite individual employment agree-
ments indicating the growers were "independent contractors." Id. at 756. The Ninth Cir-
cuit utilized an "expansive interpretation" of FLSA definitions, "in order to effectuate 
the broad remedial purposes of the FLSA and found that an employer-employee rela-
tionship existed." [d. at 754. The case was remanded to the district court to determine 
which of the workers were covered by the FLSA in light of the Ninth Circuit's finding 
that an employment relationship existed. [d. 
73. [d. at 754. 
74. 324 U.S. 490 (1945) (employees who worked in a warehouse and central office 
that serviced a chain of retail stores sought minimum wage under the FLSA even though 
not all their work affected interstate commerce). 
75. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493. 
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purposes of the FLSA.76 
The Court observed that the specific nature of the employ-
ees' work must be examined on a case by case basis to determine 
if the employees were entitled to minimum wage.77 The Court 
noted that the employees in Phillips were engaged in interstate 
commerce and were not exempt from minimum wage under the 
FLSA retail service exemption.7s 
The Ninth Circuit followed the rationale in Phillips in de-
ciding Worthington u. Icicle Seafoods, Inc .. 79 The Ninth Circuit 
76. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the legislative intent behind the FLSA was to 
narrowly construe its exemptions in order to give full effect to the FLSA's purpose. Id. at 
493. In Phillips, the Court relied on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's May 24, 1934 
message to Congress reg~rding the purpose of the FLSA. Id. The President stated, "The 
Fair Labor Standards Act was designed to extend the frontiers of social progress by in-
suring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day's pay for a fair day's 
work." Id. 
The Court determined that the employees were engaged in interstate commerce and 
that the nature of the employees' tasks did not "fall within either the terms or spirit of 
the exemption .... " Id. at 498. Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, observed: 
Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legisla-
tion must therefore be narrowly construed, giving due regard 
to the plain meaning of the statutory language and the intent 
of Congress. To extend an exemption to other than those 
plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to 
abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced 
will of the people. 
Phillips, 324 U.S. at 498. 
See also Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950) (exemptions 
to the FLSA minimum wage provisions construed to find that employees of a govern-
ment munitions factory were not exempt from FLSA minimum wage under the govern-
ment employee exemption). Justice Burton observed, "[E)mployees not thus ex-
empted ... remain within the Act." Id. at 517. The FLSA exempts employees under 
contract with the United States from its minimum wage protection. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (e)(l) 
(1988). However, the Court determined that the workers were independent contractors, 
not "employees of the United States," and awarded them minimum wage. United States 
Cartridge, 339 U.S. at 504-06. The Court also interpreted the FLSA to qualify the muni-
tions produced as "goods," even though the munitions were only to be delivered to their 
"ultimate consumer," the United States. Id. at 512-15. 
77. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 492-94, 498. See also Marshall v. Intraworld Commodities 
Corp., 89 Lab Cas. 49,269 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (district court specifically examined the vari-
ous tasks that the worker performed in order to determine if his work was exempt under 
the FLSA). 
78. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 494-98. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1988). This FLSA provi-
sion exempts any employee who works for a retail or service establishment if more than 
fifty percent of that establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is 
made within the state where the establishment is located. Id. 
79. 749 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1979) (Icicle I) (maintenance employees aboard a fish 
processing barge sued to recover over 8000 overtime hours under the FLSA overtime 
13
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observed that labels or titles were not controlling in determining 
whether an employee was exempt from FLSA minimum wage 
provisions.80 Rather, the Ninth Circuit found that the character 
of the work performed and the capacity in which one is princi-
pally employed are the standards for determining whether an 
employee is covered by the FLSA.81 Therefore, an employer can 
r.ely on an FLSA exemption only if it can be shown that the 
employees fit "plainly and unmistakably" within the terms of 
the exemption.82 
The circuit courts have also determined that FLSA mini-
provision). In the Icicle cases, the employer argued that the employees were exempt from 
FLSA coverage according to 29 U.S.C § 213 (a)(5) (1978) (employee that catches, takes, 
propagates, harvests, cultivates, or farms fish, shellfish, crustacea, seaweeds and other 
aquatice life and is exempt from FLSA minimum wage provisions). See 29 U.S.C. § 213 
(a)(5) (1978) which states that an employee is exempt from FLSA minimum wage if they 
are employed in, "Catching, ... harvesting, cultivating or farming any kind of fish, 
shellfish. . . or other aquatic forms of .animal and vegetable life, or in the first process-
ing, canning, or packing such marine products at sea as an incident to, or in conjunction 
with, such fishing operations .... " The Ninth Circuit noted that FLSA exemptions 
were to be narrowly construed in order to ensure workers maximum coverage. Icicle II, 
774 F.2d at 352. 
80. Icicle II, 774 F.2d at 352-53. 
81. Id. at 352-53. In Icicle II, the court observed that, "One does not become a 
seaman under the FLSA [exemption] merely by performing services aboard a vessel on 
navigable waters." Id. at 353. 
82. Icicle II, 774 F.2d at 352. The Ninth Circuit determined that the employees in 
Icicle II primarily performed industrial duties and the occasional maritime duties they 
performed did not significantly aid navigation of the vessel. Id. at 353. The court found 
these employees performed non-exempt work. Id. 
The Supreme Court observed that the determination of the specific nature of an 
employee's job is an issue of fact. Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545, 546 (947) 
(Wage-Hour administrator sought to enjoin an employer from violating FLSA overtime 
provisions; employees were engineers in a'power plant). The Court noted that the district 
court properly viewed the evidentiary facts in determining that the employees were not 
entitled to minimum wage based on the executive exemption. General Industries, 330 
U.S. at 550. The district court heard all of the evidence, made special findings of fact, 
and thereafter concluded that the employees were not covered by the FLSA according to 
the executive exemption. Id. at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has followed this finding. See 
Hoyt v. General Ins. Co. of America, 249 F.2d 589 (1957) (employee worked as an insur-
ance company inspector and sought unpaid overtime compensation). 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the issue of whether an employee was exempt from 
any FLSA provision was ultimately a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Id. at 590. The executive exemption excludes any bona fide administrative or profes-
sional employee. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(l) (1988). In Hoyt, the employee's job duties in-
cluded inspecting boilers and machinery that his employer insured. Hoyt, 249 F.2d at 
590. The court found that the employee was an administrative employee and therefore 
exempt from the FLSA. Id. See also Wainscoat v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng. Co., Inc. 471 
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1973) (Operations and Drilling Rig Superintendents sought unpaid 
overtime wages under the FLSA). 
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mum wage exemptions do not apply to a worker who performs 
both exempt and non-exempt activities in the same work week.s3 
In Hodgson u. Wittenburg,s. the Fifth Circuit noted that per-
formance of both exempt and non-exempt work during the same 
work week defeats any exemption that would otherwise apply.slI 
83. Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. 
Six Flags Over Georgia, 474 F.2d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 
1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1972). See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text for discussion of 
these cases. Generally, employees who work "in agriculture" are exempt from FLSA min-
imum wage coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1988). But see Farmers Reservoir & Irriga-
tion Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (Court extended the statutory definition of 
agriculture to embrace a primary and secondary concept of agriculture, one which was 
exempt from FLSA coverage and the other which was non-exempt), reh'g denied. 338 
U.S. 839 (1949). The Court found that the employees performed agricultural activities 
under both concepts and awarded them minimum wage under the FLSA. Id. Various 
circuit courts have also awarded minimum wage in situations where an employer 
processed some of his sugar cane for agriculture (exempt under the FLSA), and the bal-
ance of his sugar cane for non-agricultural purposes (non-exempt under the FLSA). 
NLRB v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714 
(9th Cir. 1957); Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F.2d 934 (2nd Cir. 1942); and Bowie v. Gonzalez, 
117 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941) (sugar cane processing employees found not to be employed 
"in agriculture"; therefore covered by FLSA minimum wage provisions). See also NLRB 
v. Tovera Packing Co., 111 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1940) (minimum wage awarded where em-
ployees worked in feed pens of a meat packing plant which serviced both stock ranch 
animals, an exempt service, and animals ready for conditioning and fattening, a non-
exempt service). 
84. 464 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1972) (Secretary of Labor sued an employer on behalf of 
some agricultural workers to recover unpaid minimum wages and to enjoin the employer 
from violating various FLSA provisions). 
85. Hodgson, 464 F.2d at 1221. See "also Brennan v. Six Flags Over Georgia. 474 
F.2d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1973) (amusement park workers sought minimum wage for all the 
hours they worked as maintenance workers and general park employees). In Six Flags, 
the court found that amusement park maintenance workers who did small, new construc-
tion jobs were entitled to be paid minimum wage, even though the FLSA exempts 
amusement and recreational establishment employees. Id. at 19. As the amusement park 
employees performed some exempt general amusement park work during the season and 
non-exempt maintenance work throughout the year, they were "covered fully" by the 
FLSA minimum wage provisions. Id. The court noted that, "The nature of the work is 
what gives rise to the need for an exemption; the exemption is not a subsidy accorded to 
an employer because of his principal activity." Id. 
See also Skipper v. Superior Dairies, 512 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1975) (dairy delivery-
route man sued his former employer under the FLSA to recover back overtime wages for 
the entire period of his employment). In Superior Dairies, the employer asserted that 
the employee was exempt from FLSA minimum wage coverage according to 29 U.S.C. § 
213(b)(12) (1972), which exempts any employee in agriculture from the FLSA overtime 
provisions at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1972). Id. at 411. The employee in Superior Dairies deliv-
ered various dairy products to grocery and convenience stores. Id. at 410-11. The em-
ployer did not own any cows, or produce any dairy products. Id. at 411. The Fifth Circuit 
determined that the employee did not perform activities that were related to "dairying" 
and agriculture. Superior Dairies, 512 F.2d at 411-12. The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
even if the deliveryman performed dairying or agricultural duties, he would not be ex-
15
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In Hodgson, the employees were primarily engaged in the han-
dling, care and feeding of livestock that were purchased at auc-
tion for immedia te resale.86 Such isolated activities fell within 
the FLSA agric'Jlture exemption.87 However, the court deter-
mined that the employees also performed non-agricultural work 
that was unrelated to operating a livestock auction.88 Therefore, 
the Fifth Circuit found that the nonexempt activities of the em-
ployees made the agricultural exemption inapplicable and 
awarded minimum wage.89 
.D. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1974 DOMESTIC WORKER 
AMENDMENTS 
The 1974 FLSA Domestic Service Worker Amendments90 
have been construed to extend minimum wage to various groups 
of laborers.91 The District Court of Puerto Rico held that work-
ers who provided services normally performed by family mem-
bers were entitled to minimum wage coverage under the 
amendment.92 
empt from the FLSA as he also performed non-exempt work activities. [d. The court 
observed, "Nor does it make any difference that the employee is doing mixed work. In 
any week that any particular employee does some non-exempt work he is covered fully, 
not pro-rata." [d. at 411 (citing Six Flags, 474 F.2d at 19). See also infra notes 92-96 and 
accompanying text. 
86. Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1972). In 1961, Con-
gress enacted a "specific and limited (FLSA) exemption" for employees who are also 
engaged in livestock auctions. [d. at 1221. See 29U.S.C. § 213(b)(13) (1988). 
87. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (A) (1972). The court examined the language of 29 U.S.C. § 
213(a)(6)(A) (1972). Hodgson, 464 F.2d at 1223. Any employee in agriculture is exempt 
from the FLSA if the employee is employed by an employer who did not, during any 
calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use more than 500 man-days of 
agricultural labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(A) (1972). 
88. Hodgson, 464 F.2d at 1221. 
89. [d. at 1223. 
90. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). 
91. Marshall v. Cordero, 508 F. Supp. 324 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1981) (minimum wage 
extended to domestic worker who performed babysitting services, cleaned the employer's 
house and raked the employer's yard). See infra notes 92-102. 
92. Marshall v. Cordero, 508 F. Supp. 324 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1981). In Cordero, the 
district court reasoned that the intent of Congress was to extend minimum wage to those 
people who performed home-related, noncommercial labor in private family homes that 
were normally and traditionally carried out by family members. [d. See Marshall v. 
Rose, 616 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1980). Night watchmen who performed extra domestic ser-
vices such as answering the phone, checking for mechanical or electrical failures, walking 
the dogs and watching the grandchildren in addition to their patrolling duties were 
granted minimum wage for hours spent doing extra duties). The dispute in Rose devel-
oped when the employer did not want to pay the watchmen minimum wage for time 
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In Marshall u. Intraworld Commodities Corp.,93 the New 
York Eastern District Court held that a part-time domestic 
worker was not exempt as a "casual" babysitter and awarded 
him minimum wage.9• The court observed that the employee 
performed additional domestic service duties including cooking, 
cleaning, washing and ironing clothes, raking the yard, and car-
ing for the employer's children. 9~ The court determined that 
these non-exempt services entitled the worker to minimum wage 
for all the hours worked, including the time spent performing 
services which might otherwise fall under the "casual basis" 
babysitting exemption.96 
The companionship services exemption to the 1974 FLSA 
Amendments was raised in Bonnette u. California Health & 
Welfare Agency.97 In Bonnette I, a group of domestic service 
attendants who cared for elderly and 'infirm clients sought un-
paid minimum wage payments from the California State Health 
and Welfare Department.98 The district court fQund that 
whether the domestic service attendants provided mere "com-
panionship services" to the disabled recipients of public assis-
tance was an issue of fact. 99 Five years later, in Bonnette u. Cali-
fornia Health & Welfare (Bonnette II),t°o the district court 
found that the plaintiff "chore workers" were entitled to mini-
spent doing additional domestic services. Rose, 616 F.2d at i03-04. After specifically ex-
amining the additional duties the watchmen performed and the intent of Congress, the 
district court noted that watchmen are specifically covered by the FLSA. [d. at 104. The 
court reasoned that the FLSA domestic service provision should be broadly construed so 
that the watchmen were entitled to minimum wage for the additional domestic services 
they provided. [d. 
93. 89 Lab. Cas. 49,269 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
94. [d. at 49,272-73. 
95. [d. at 49,271. 
96. [d. at 49,272. See Lopez v. Roderiguez, 668 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (full-time, 
live in domestic housekeeper and babysitter awarded unpaid minimum wages under the 
FLSA). 
97. 414 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Bonnette I). Bonnette [ involved various 
motions for summary judgment. [d. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
98. Bonnette [, 414 F. Supp. at 212. The State moved for summary judgment, as-
serting that the attendants were exempt from FLSA minimum wage provisions as they 
were companions to the aged and infirm. [d. 
99. [d. at 214. The court determined that there was a triable issue of fact as to the 
amount of time the attendants devoted to general household work and it denied the 
motions for summary judgment. [d. 
100. 525 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Bonnette Il). The court observed, "Plain-
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mum wage according to the FLSA domestic service provision.lol 
The court determined that extending FLSA provisions to these 
"chore workers" provided them with a reasonable wage and en-
sured the continued viability of the in-home care program.102 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In McCune v. Oregon Senior Services,103 the Ninth Circuit 
majority held that domestic service employees who provided in-
home support services for elderly and infirm clients were not en-
titled to receive minimum wage. 104 The court determined that 
the attendants were mere companions, and did not· possess the 
requisite training to warrant minimum wage protection. 1011 
1. The Companionship Service Exemption 
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the companion-
ship service exemption applied to the attendants. loa The court 
101. Bonnette II, 525 F. Supp. at 139. 
102. Id. at 13~. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding, however, the 
issue of whether the employees were exempt from FLSA minimum wage was not raised. 
Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1990). 
103. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990). 
104. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109·10. The Ninth Circuit majority found that the at-
tendants were domestic service employees, but were not entitled to minimum wage cov-
erage as they performed work that was exempted. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108-09. 
105. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. 
106. Id. at 1107-09. The Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether the "not casual" 
limitation of the FLSA applied only to babysitters and not companions as the lower 
court had determined. Id. at 1109. Although this issue had not been raised in the district 
court, the attendants argued successfully that review of the issue was appropriate. Brief 
for Appellants at 12-13, McCune v Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Nos. 88-3843 and 83-6332·PA). The attendants asserted four reasons why review of the 
"not casual" limitation was proper. Id. First, the "not casual" issue had been raised pe-
ripherally when the FLSA's legislative history relative to all minimum wage exemptions 
was argued and the district court partially based its ruling on it. [d. Second, the parties 
would not be required to develop new facts. Id. Third, the "not casual" issue involved a 
pure question of law. Id. Fourth, the constitutionality of the court's ruling and of the 
interpretive regulation posed a significant question of general impact. Id. Therefore, on 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed five issues to determine if the district court erred in 
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1107. 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. [d. at 1109. De novo is defined as 
"trying a matter anew; the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision 
had previously been rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 1979). Summary 
Judgments based on statutory construction, are reviewed de novo by the appellate court. 
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determined that the attendants provided companionship ser-
vices according to the Secretary of Labor's definition.lo7 The ma-
jority opined that public policy favored not applying the com-
panionship exemption to the attendants as they were often 
required to work under unattractive conditions. lOS However, the 
majority noted that in-home care recipients might not receive 
critical care if the State was required to pay minimum wage. I09 
The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that the attendants 
should seek to redress their claim through the legislative branch 
of the government; not through the judicial.110 Accordingly, the 
attendants were exempt from federal minimum wage coverage 
unless they were found to be excepted from the exemption. lll 
2. The Casual Limitation Exemption 
The majority then noted that the "casuallimitation,"ll2 ex-
emption applied to babysitters,113 but not to companionship ser-
vices.114 Therefore, the companionship exemption applied to the 
Turner v. McMahon, 830 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1987) (appellate courts must review a grant 
of summary judgment that construes the Social Security Act to afford overtime pay-
ments to workers de novo), cert denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988). 
107. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-10. See also, 29 C.F.R. § 552.4-6 (1989), see supra, 
note 54. The court considered the statutory exemptions to the 1974 FLSA amendment 
which required domestic service workers be paid minimum wage. McCune, 894 F.2d at 
1109-10. See supra note 6. The court then relied on the Secretary of Labor's interpreta-
tion of these exemptions. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110-11. 
108. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-10. 
109. [d. at 1110. The court noted that, "Critical services [performed by the appel-
lants) reach more elderly or infirm individuals ... because the care-providers are ex-
empt from the FLSA." [d. 
110. [d. at 1110. The court observed, "Appellants must petition the Secretary [of 
Labor) or Congress for the remedy they seek." [d. 
Ill. [d. at 1109-11. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). 
112. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-11. The court relied on 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). 
See supra note 6. Further, the court relied on 29 C.F.R. § 552.106 (1989), which states in 
part: "The 'casual' limitation does not apply to companion services." McCune, 894 F.2d 
at 1110. 
113. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. The court relied on the domestic service exemptions 
at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). See supra note 6 for the "casual limitation" language. 
114. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Secretary of La-
bor's definition of "companionship services" was not "unreasonable in light of Congres-
sional mandate." [d. at 1110. The court reasoned that when Congress delegates authority 
to an agency to explain a statute by regulation, such regulations are controlling, "unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." [d. (citing Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (Environ-
mental Protection Agency's definition of "stationary source" found to be a permissible 
construction of language from the Clean Air Acts Amendments of 1977». The Ninth 
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attendants even though they were employed on more than a cas-
ual basis. llIi 
3. The Exceptions to the Exemptions 
The majority found that the attendants did not qualify for 
minimum wage coverage under the "trained personnel" or "gen-
eral household work" exceptions to the FLSA.1l6 Relying on leg-
islative history, the majority determined that Congress intended 
that only registered nurses and licensed practical nurses quali-
fied under the "trained personnel" exception.l17 The majority 
concluded that because the attendants who were CNAs received 
only sixty hours of formal medical training they were not enti-
tled to FLSA minimum wage protection under the "trained per-
sonnel" exception.llS 
The general household work exception was found to not ap-
Circuit also relied upon a Supreme Court decision that found, "As long as the agency's 
construction is reasonable, it must be upheld." [d. (citing Connecticut Dep't of Income 
Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 532 (1985) (Medicaid Act definitions of different 
medical facilities held not to be mutually exclusive». 
115. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. The court noted that the attendants "Jive with their 
clients at a near poverty level providing around-the-clock care." [d. The court also dis-
cussed the attendants' argument that the legislative history of the FLSA exempted cas-
ual babysitters and companions as these workers "are not regular breadwinners or re-
sponsible for their families' support." [d. See also, H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845. The attendants argued unsuccessfully 
that Congress did not intend the provision to apply to them as they are breadwinners. 
McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. However, the court did not find a breadwinner/nonbreadwin-
ner distinction because Congress's statements about a breadwinner being excepted from 
the exemption "are merely policy justifications," and not a determining factor in assess-
ing if minimum wage was due." [d. The court noted that, "The plain language of the 
statute does not make this breadwinner/nonbreadwinner distinction .... " [d. 
Relying on Congressional intent, the attendant argued that the purpose of the FLSA 
was to provide coverage for "all employees whose vocation was domestic service .... " 
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845. 
Attendants argued unsuccessfully that if vocational babysitters (caretakers of the young) 
were covered, then vocational caretakers of the elderly or infirm should be covered also. 
McCune, 894 F.2d at 1HO; see also Brief for Appellants at 12-13, 23-26, McCune v. 
Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-3843 and 83-6332-PA). 
116. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110-11. 
117. [d. The court relied on the following language: "The exemption reflects the 
intent of the committee tQ exclude from coverage. . . companions for individuals who are 
unable because of age and infirmity to care for themselves. But it is not intended that 
trained personnel, such as nurses, whether licensed or practical, shall be excluded." Mc-
Cune, 894 F.2d at 1111, (citing H.R. REP. No 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 
Legislative History at 2845). 
118. [d. 
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ply to the attendants as their "general household" duties were 
directly related to the care of the recipients.1I9 The majority de-
termined that such household work was not considered "general 
household" work under this exception.120 Further, the majority 
noted that even if an otherwise exempt "companion" performed 
general household work, he would still be exempted from mini-
mum wage coverage if the general household work was inciden-
tal to the recipient's care.121 The Ninth Circuit majority deter-
mined that the attendants' household work was incidental.122 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Dissenting, Judge Pregerson asserted that the purpose of 
the FLSA was to extend minimum wage protection broadly to a 
large number of workers.123 He noted that a logical extension of 
the Supreme Court's holding in PhillipS124 was that exceptions 
119. Id. See supra note 54 for the text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). 
120. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111 (citing H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, 
reprinted in Legislative History at 2845). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
121. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. The court relied on 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See 
supra note 54 for the text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). The work is incidental work if it 
does not exceed twenty percent of the total weekly hours worked. McCune, 894 F.2d at 
1111. 
122. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. The court relied on the Congressional comment, 
"The fact that persons performing casual services as baby-sitters or services as compan-
ions do some incident of household work does not keep them from being casual baby-
sitters or companions for purposes of this exclusion." Id. (citing H.R. REP No. 913, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845). 
Finally, the majority held that the attendants had to be compensated for all hours 
the State of Oregon permitted them to work. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. However, the 
court refused to impute the knowledge of hours worked from the individual recipients to 
the State, even though the State and care recipients were deemed joint employers. Id. at 
1111-12. See Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 
1981) (State and in-home care recipients were joint employers). In Bonnette, the court 
did not determine whether the recipient's knowledge of hours worked should be imputed 
to the state. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that knowledge of the total hours worked could 
be imputed under a general agency theory. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. However, the 
court observed that allowing the in-home care recipients to control the number of hours 
their attendants worked, and then forcing the State to pay for those hours was inappro-
priate, and would remove much of the control from the agencies in charge of adminis-
trating the in-home care program. Id. at 1111-12. 
123. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 1113. Judge Pregerson noted that Congress intended the FLSA to 
broaden, not narrow the number of workers eligible for minimum wage coverage. Id. See 
supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Phillips. 
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to the FLSA exemptions should be broadly construed. m 
Further, Judge Pregerson asserted that the majority misap-
plied definitions from the Code of Federal Regulations126 to the 
employees.127 He urged that if the employees provided substan-
tial domestic service or received significant formal training in a 
domestic service area, they were entitled to receive minimum 
wage.U8 
Judge Pregerson reasoned that many of the attendants re-
ceived the requisite formal training needed to qualify as trained 
personnel.129 According to the dissent the majority erred in de-
termining that the legislative examples of a "registered or prac-
tical nurse" were the only types of domestic service workers that 
Congress intended to qualify as "trained personnel" for FLSA 
minimum wage protection.130 The majority completely disre-
garded the attendants' CNA training as it was not as extensive 
as that received by a registered nurse or licensed practical 
nurse.13l Judge Pregerson contended that by ignoring the plain-
tiffs' training, the majority was overlooking the realities of a rap-
idly changing health care industry where many patients are 
forced to rely on practically trained medical personnel. 132 
Judge Pregerson also urged that the attendants' work was 
clearly neither casual nor strictly companionship in nature.133 
Relying on legislative history, he asserted that the attendants' 
duties went far beyond basic chores such as preparing meals or 
washing diapers.13• He further urged that the labor regulations 
125. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113. Judge Pregerson relied on President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's May 24, 1934 message to Congress. See supra note 74. 
126. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113-14. Judge Pregerson further relied on 29 C.F.R. §§ 
552.1-6 (1989). See supra note 54 for text of 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.1-6 (1989). 
127. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1114. 
128. [d. at 1112-14. 
129. [d. at 1113. Judge Pregerson reasoned that the CNA attendants received sixty 
hours of formal medical training so they should not to be exempted as mere companions 
or habysitters. [d. at 1112-14. 
130. [d. 
131. McCune,894 F.2d at 1112-14. 
132. [d. Judge Pregerson observed, "The argument that CNA attendants are not 
trained for purposes of minimum wage coverage smacks of elitism. This conclusion is by 
no means dictated by the language of the regulation." [d. 
133. [d. at 1112-14. 
134. [d. at 1112-13. Judge Pregerson observed: 
The babysitter/companion exemption is meant to apply to 
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should not be read to exclude the attendants from mInImUm 
wage protection as some of their work fell into an exempted cat-
egory.m Rather, employees who performed exempt and nonex-
empt work activities during the same work week are entitled to 
minimum wage for all of their work.136 
Judge Pregerson further contended that the majority failed 
to look at the attendants' actual job functions. ls7 He asserted 
that Congress intended that an employee's actual job function 
and not their job title should determine whether that employee 
was entitled to minimum wage. ISS Accordingly, Judge Pregerson 
urged that if the majority looked at the attendants' actual job 
functions, the attendants would not be disqualified from mini-
mum wage protection under the "companionship services" ex-
emption. ls9 Therefore, Judge Pregerson would have remanded 
the case to determine whether the attendants' specific job func-
tions and training entitled them to minimum wage.140 
part-time workers not involved in hard domestic labor who do 
not look to their work as a principle means of support. The 
regulation should not be read to exclude precisely those per-
sons Congress meant to protect with the 1974 FLSA amend-
ments. This is however, what the district court did when it 
categorized (the attendants) without looking to the actual na-
ture of the work they perform. Though simple meal prepara-
tion might be "incidental," what of specially prepared nutri-
tional diets .. , and the administration of medication? 
Though simple laundry work might be "incidental," what of 
bed-pan duty, catheterization, and soiled linens and garments 
for bed-ridden invalids? These duties are certainly related to 
the care of the attendant's client, but are by no means inci-
dental. The work is hard and back-breaking, requiring pa-
tience and stamina, and is critical to adequate medical care of 
many elderly and disabled persons who live at home. 
McCune, 894 F.2d at 1114. 
135. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113-14. See supra note 54 for text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 
(1989), for discussion of relevant labor regulations. 
136. [d. Judge Pregerson relied on Skipper v. Superior Dairies, 512 F.2d 409 (5th 
Cir. 1975), Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1972), and Brennan v. Six 
Flags Over Georgia, 474 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 83-89 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of these cases. 
137. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113-14. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. at 1114. 
140. [d. Judge Pregerson determined that the attendants' duties clearly lifted them 
from mere companion status and entitled them to minimum wage. [d. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
In McCune,l41 the Ninth Circuit seemingly failed to adhere 
to Congress' intent to extend the FLSA to a broad range of 
workersl42 by denying a logical extension of minimum wage pro-
tection to the domestic service attendants in the instant case. 
Historically, the courts have interpreted the FLSA and its 
amendments liberally. This led to a large number of employees 
qualifying for FLSA protection despite various potential exemp-
tions. us In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit majority ignored 
the principles previously established and significantly limited 
FLSA minimum wage protection for domestic workers. 
It has been observed that a factual determination of an em-
ployee's actual job function must be made in order to ascertain 
if that employee is entitled to FLSA protection. l44 The Ninth 
Circ~it followed this reasoning in determining that the employ-
ees in Icicle were entitled to minimum wage. In However, in the 
instant case, the Ninth Circuit did not inquire into the attend-
ants' actual job functions. Rather, the majority relied on labels 
provided by the district court and the defendants in finding that 
the attendants were companion workers. The Ninth Circuit 
failed to examine whether any factual determination had been 
made by the district court about the nature and quality of the 
attendants' jobs before exempting them from FLSA minimum 
wage protection. 146 
Factually, it would seem that the attendants' job duties 
were more than mere companionship services and thus the at-
tendants should have been entitled to FLSA minimum wage 
141. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990). 
142. See supra notes 67·102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the related 
FLSA wage cases. See also supra notes 42·66 and accompanying text for discussion of 
FLSA and the relevant 1974 amendments. 
143. See supra notes 67·102 and accompanying text. 
144. Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545 (1947) (Wage·Hour Administrator 
sought to enjoin an employer from violating FLSA overtime provisions; employees were 
engineers in a power plant). See supra notes 71·82 and accompanying text. 
145. Worthington v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 774. F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1984). (Icicle 
Il) See supra notes 76·80 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 77·82 and accompanying text for discussion of the importance 
of determining an employee's job functions and duties in FLSA wage cases. 
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coverage.147 However, the district court improperly granted the 
defendants' summary judgment without making a factual deter-
mination as to the nature and quality of the attendants' specific 
job functions. 148 The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this error. 
It would have been more appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to 
remand McCune to the district court to specifically review the 
attendants' actual job functions. H9 
Further, the attendants performed both exempt and nonex-
empt work. Courts have construed the FLSA to hold that if an 
employee performed both exempt and nonexempt work during 
the same week, then that employee was entitled to minimum 
wage for all work performed.1llo However, the attendants lost the 
benefit of this FLSA construction because a factual determina-
tion was not made, and the Ninth Circuit majority erred by not 
requiring a determination be made. llli 
The majority properly recognized several categories of work 
that were covered by the FLSA. However, the trained personnel 
exception was narrowly construed. The majority accepted Con-
gress' listed examples of trained personnel as exhaustive.11l2 
Prior court decisions suggest that the Ninth Circuit should have 
considered these examples as illustrative. 11l3 An expansive inter-
pretation would have resulted in the CNA attendants qualifying 
as trained personnel. This outcome would have recognized the 
vital care the CNA attendants provide and the changes in the 
health care industry which have led to increased reliance on 
home-based care. Likewise, the underlying purpose of the FLSA, 
to protect a large group of workers, would better be served. 
The second category of work, "general household work," 
was also narrowly construed. The Ninth Circuit found that the 
attendants' work was "too related to the care" of the recipients, 
and basically' eliminated the entire exception. The majority de-
147. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. In making such determinations, 
other courts have liberally interpreted what qualifies as nonexempt work. [d. 
151. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1990). See 
supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. 
25
Lightfoot: Employment Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
172 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:147 
termined that the facts of this case were insufficient to establish 
that the employees were engaged in nonexempt general house-
hold work. Therefore, it appears that it will be impossible for a 
similarly situated employee to show that their household work 
was unrelated to the care of the recipient. Consequently, the 
Ninth Circuit denied minimum wage protection to a group of 
workers that Congress seemingly intended to protect. 
Further, the holding in McCune appears to have been re-
sult-oriented as the majority focused its concern on whether the 
State of Oregon would be able to pay FLSA wages to the attend-
ants. lll' However, it was incorrect to give primary importance to 
the potential costs that the attendants' employers might have to 
bear.lllll The companionship service exemption is present to pre-
vent minimum wage from being unreasonably extended. For ex-
ample, it would be unreasonable to require an elderly neighbor/ 
employer to pay minimum wage to a neighborhood youth who 
visits weekly and helps organize the elderly person's affairs and 
accompanies them grocery shopping. 
The primary focus should be to protect the employees' in-
terests; not the employers' interests. In enacting the FLSA, Con-
gress was concerned that the unorganized and lowest paid mem-
bers of this nation's work force were suffering from unfair labor 
practices. 11l6 Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Ninth Cir-
cuit to give the FLSA's primary purpose secondary status by 
over-extending the companionship service exemption to protect 
an employer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit strictly relied upon the Secretary of La-
bor's definitions and the provisions of the FLSA to exempt the 
attendants from minimum wage protection. 11l7 Accordingly, after 
154. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
155. The State of Oregon and the in-home care recipients were determined to be 
joint employers, but this was not at issue. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 
1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1990). 
156. See supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text. In light of the humanitarian and 
remedial purpose of the FLSA, the McCune decision appears to defeat Congress' intent 
to extend minimum wage to a broad range of workers. 
157. The Ninth Circuit deferred to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation as to 
whether a domestic service worker was entitled to minimum wage under the FLSA. Mc-
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McCune, domestic service employees who perform "companion-
ship" job functions will probably be forced to seek amendments 
to the FLSA in order to receive the federal minimum wage. Un-
fortunately, most domestic service workers do not have the re-
sources to seek such legislative changes because they are paid 
less than minimum wage. IllS Thus, the Ninth Circuit's strict ad-
herence to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the FLSA 
and its unwillingness to order that a determination be made as 
to the attendants' job functions may be economically damaging 
to a valuable, humanitarian work force. IlI9 
Stephen K. Lightfoot JI* 
Cune, 894 F.2d at 1110-11. Since many courts read the Secretary's definitions broadly, 
and the Ninth Circuit read the Secretary's definitions narrowly, there is likely a need for 
Congress to provide further legislation that will explicitly provide which domestic service 
workers qualify for minimum wage. Without a definite provision, courts and employers 
seemingly will be unguided in their decisions of whether the FLSA covers or excludes the 
employee. 
158. Telephone interview with Gayle Troutwine, Attorney for the plaintiffs, Jay Mc-
Cune, et al. (September 20, 1990). 
159. The McCune decision will not be overturned by the United States Supreme 
Court because many of the original plaintiffs have moved from Oregon, or are no longer 
interested in pursuing their claim. Telephone interview with Gayle Troutwine, Attorney 
for the plaintiffs, Jay McCune, et al. (September 20, 1990). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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